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Abstract 
This paper looks at the interactions between environmental and industrial 
restructuring within the Newfoundland and Labrador fishery and regime 
shifts in three main policy areas related to fisheries. Our focus is the 
gendered consequences of interactive restructuring across policy areas for 
the ability of women and men in fisheries households in Newfoundland and 
Labrador to make a living. The three main policy areas include fisheries 
management policy, Employment Insurance policy and policy related to the 
regulation of occupational health and workers compensation. We document 
important similarities in the overall pattern and outcomes of regime shift 
within these three policy areas and point to ways these changes have inter-
acted with resource degradation and industrial restructuring to influence the 
lives and livelihoods of fishery dependent people. 
Résumé 
Cette étude porte sur l'interaction entre la restructuration environnementale 
et industrielle dans le secteur des pêches de Terre-Neuve-et-Labrador, et les 
changements de régime survenus dans trois secteurs de dépenses importants 
des pêches. L'étude concerne les répercussions pour les sexes de la restruc-
turation interactive dans les secteurs de dépenses sur la capacité des femmes 
et des hommes des ménages de Terre-Neuve-et-Labrador qui vivent de la 
pêche de gagner leur vie. Les trois principaux secteurs de dépenses compren-
nent la politique sur la gestion des pêches, la politique sur l'assurance-
emploi et la politique sur la réglementation de la santé au travail et la 
rémunération des travailleurs. L'étude fait état des ressemblances impor-
tantes dans la structure générale et les résultats des changements de régime 
dans ces trois secteurs de dépenses et indique des façons dont ces change-
ments ont interagi avec le dépérissement des ressources et la restructuration 
industrielle pour influer sur la vie et le gagne-pain des personnes tributaires 
de la pêche. 
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Introduction 
In coastal areas of the Canadian province of Newfoundland and Labrador, 
people have traditionally depended on the fisheries and forestry indus-
tries, both of which have undergone dramatic economic restructuring in 
the past 15 years.1 In this paper we focus on the intersection of changes in 
three key policy areas with economic restructuring in fisheries and the 
gendered consequences for the ability of individuals, households and 
communities to sustain, or move towards, healthy livelihoods. These 
areas include: 1) Employment Insurance (EI), 2) fisheries management 
policies, and 3) workers compensation policies. 
The restructuring of state policies has been an important component of 
overall restructuring over the past two decades.2 Neo-liberal reforms have 
emphasized privatization, individual responsibility, targeting of programs 
to the 'right' people, and efficiency. We examine parallel trends and 
issues in each policy area related to delivery, eligibility and benefits. We 
focus on the "fit" (or lack thereof) of the policies with the reality of the 
coastal economy/ecology. Finally, we discuss interactions and contradic-
tions amongst the three policies and their consequences for peoples' 
struggles to navigate their way through the rules for fisheries manage-
ment, EI and workers compensation in a context of ecological degrada-
tion and industrial change. Impacts on the health and well-being of 
individuals, families, the fishery, and coastal communities are highlighted 
and gender issues are addressed throughout. 
In doing so, we draw on over 80 key informant interviews, 3 focus 
groups on EI and over 60 in-depth household interviews conducted in 
three areas of Newfoundland and Labrador. We draw also on linked 
Coasts Under Stress research on fishermen's knowledge and science 
(Murray et al. 2006), and on SafetyNet research on occupational health in 
fishing and shellfish processing (Howse et al. 2006; Bornstein et al. 
2006). The Coasts Under Stress research was carried out between 2001-
2004 in the communities of the Labrador Straits, the Hawkes-Bay/Port au 
Choix area on the Great Northern Peninsula, and in White Bay South. The 
SafetyNet research was carried out in multiple regions of the province. 
The period between 1990 and the present has been one of substantial 
downsizing and reorganization within the fishing industry, historically the 
most important sector from an employment perspective. These changes 
were triggered by the collapse of the groundfish stocks in the early 1990s, 
and resulting moratoria on groundfish harvesting introduced by the 
federal government starting in 1992 on the northeast coast and in 
Labrador, and in 1994, on Newfoundland's west coast. As a result, 
groundfish fisheries and plants were temporarily closed. Since then, there 
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has been significant economic recovery in the Newfoundland fishing 
industry, though this has been primarily fuelled by an expansion in snow 
crab and shrimp quotas rather than by a recovery of the groundfish stocks. 
By 2003, the crab and shrimp fisheries accounted for over 75% of earn-
ings from harvesting, in a fishing economy with a total landed value 
significantly greater than in the pre-moratorium years (Dunne 2003). 
Not surprisingly, the recovery has been associated with major changes 
in the shape of the industry related to the species harvested and processed, 
the products generated, and the resource management regime. It has also 
been associated with major changes in the distribution of industry wealth. 
Within harvesting, an industry split between primarily large, corporate-
owned trawlers and a smaller inshore fishery with a limited mid-sized 
owner-operator sector has been replaced by an industry dominated by 
owner-operators with numbers of smaller boat (< 35 feet) operators 
declining more rapidly than the mid-sized fleet (35-65 feet). However, 
large income differentials can be found between those with fulltime and 
supplementary snow crab licenses and those with only small boat licenses 
or no access to snow crab and shrimp licenses. Within processing, the 
elimination of the large, trawler-fed groundfish plants has meant that the 
emphasis has shifted to shellfish processing and to seasonal operations. 
Overall, employment and earnings have recovered more in the harvesting 
sector than in processing (Dunne 2003). In terms of gender, more women 
entered fish harvesting in the 1980s and 1990s, but they still comprised 
only about 20% of fish harvesters in 2000 (Grzetic 2004). In 2000, 
approximately 54% of fishplant workers and labourers working in fish 
and shellfish processing were women (5,380/9,920) (Community 
Accounts Newfoundland and Labrador). An aging and vulnerable labour 
force typifies much of the fisheries sector, particularly in processing. 
From Keynesian State to Social Investment State: 
The Larger Context 
The restructuring of federal and provincial policies has been an important 
component of overall restructuring in Newfoundland and Labrador since 
the mid-1980s and policy change has interacted with industrial and envi-
ronmental restructuring to affect the health of people, communities and 
their environments (Dolan et al. 2005). The policy period has been char-
acterized as one of de-regulation and re-regulation, involving both the 
institutional framework supporting capital accumulation and the structure 
of social policy. Broadly speaking, there has been a change in the mode of 
regulation to support a change in the regime of accumulation. It is impor-
tant to understand trends in the general national policy discourse as well 
as its regional/rural resonance (both explicitly and implicitly). 
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In Canada, the post-war Keynesian state policy regime included 
regional and rural development initiatives as well as an expanding social 
safety net. In the 1980s, however, Keynesian demand side economic poli-
cies gave way to supply side policies. Neo-liberal reforms emphasized the 
primacy of the market (and market 'adjustment') and reduced govern-
ment spending. Support for private capital accumulation in the context of 
technological change and globalization was expressed through freer trade, 
less government ownership, lower corporate taxes, and policies to support 
flexible, cheap labour (Vosko and Stanford 2005; Cossman and Fudge 
2002). The balance between private and public responsibility shifted 
towards private. One aspect of this was the erosion of the social safety net 
through a series of Unemployment Insurance (UI) reforms, including the 
1996 changes, where the program was renamed Employment Insurance 
(EI). These years also saw the replacement of the Canada Assistance Plan 
(CAP) with the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) (MacDonald 
1999; McKeen and Porter 2003; Cossman and Fudge 2002; Dobrowolsky 
2004). As well, the federal and provincial governments have tried to get 
out of the regional/rural development business and the business of 
resource management, moving more of the onus onto industry and 
communities. Privatization, individual responsibility, targeting of 
programs to the 'right' people (or the right companies or sectors), and an 
emphasis on "efficiency" have characterized government policy initia-
tives. Increased surveillance has gone along with targeting, in order to 
monitor efficiency gains and enforce limited access (to programs, 
resources, benefits, and so on). 
This regime shift has not necessarily meant less government, but rather 
a shift in what governments and related agencies do (Tupper 2001). This 
has taken different forms in different policy areas. Thus, while privatiza-
tion might mean deregulation in one industry (e.g. airlines), it means 
marketization in another (e.g. intervening to introduce market principles 
and relations in fisheries). In some policy areas there was a shift in 
responsibilities across governments, often downloading responsibility to 
lower levels of government or to non-governmental groups - both public 
and private. Sometimes governments became purchasers of services 
rather than providers of services. In the area of the social safety net, the 
emphasis on the market was expressed by increased emphasis on individ-
ual responsibility for social security - primarily through attachment to the 
labour market and private saving for contingencies (e.g. Registered 
Retirement Savings Plans and Registered Education Savings Plans). 
There was a related realignment of responsibility for social security as 
depicted by the welfare triangle (state, market, family) or welfare 
diamond (state, market, family, community) metaphors used in the 
welfare regimes literature (Dobrowolsky and Jenson 2005; Esping 
Anderson 1999; Lewis 1992; O'Connor et al. 1999). 
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Some writers have emphasized that neo-liberal ideology has evolved 
since the early days of government cutbacks and deficit fighting. While 
the early period may be thought of as destroying the Reynesian state 
model, the recent period is one of constructing and consolidating a new 
state model consistent with a neo-liberal market focus. Dobrowolsky, 
Jenson and others argue that the late 1990s saw the re-emergence of a 
more activé government role in promoting well-being which has been 
labeled the "social investment state." They argue that Canada, the UK and 
New Zealand are leaders in this approach, which marries a market focus 
with a centre-left concern for social well-being (Dobrowolsky and Jenson 
2005; Dobrowolsky and Saint Martin 2005). Social welfare is now 
couched in the language of economics and the market. While new spend-
ing is being introduced, the provision of social supports is seen as an 
"investment" in future productivity, not an end in itself. 
In a social investment approach the idea is to provide human capital 
and social capital investments which will enable people (now or down the 
road) to take responsibility for their own well-being. Adults are encour-
aged to be self-sufficient, but not all adults are equally attractive as 
investment subjects. While employment is expected of all adults, training 
investments are very selectively made with an eye to the likely return, and 
individuals are expected to be active investors in their own future produc-
tivity. As we will discuss below, in a social investment context, the 
people in our resource-based coastal communities may be less than ideal 
candidates. Those who are poor investments provide a cheap source of 
labour to the market. The new state is also characterized as a "partnering 
state," enlisting the private sector, and the community and volunteer 
sectors in the delivery of services (Larner and Butler 2005). This raises 
issues of the equality of partners and the locus of control. 
The three policy areas we examine below (Employment Insurance, 
fisheries management and workers compensation) were shaped by neo-
liberal reforms in the deficit-fighting era of the early to mid 1990s. 
However, they have evolved to reflect the changing policy discourse in 
the surplus era. For example, some of the most severe elements of the EI 
reform have been rescinded since 2000 when we began our fieldwork. 
The framework of the neo-liberal and social investment state provides a 
lens to examine trends and parallels in the programs which most affect the 
livelihood and options of the people in our study area in their day-to-day 
navigation of the rules governing resource access and income support. 
What shifts have occurred in their access to fishing income, EI, training 
or workers compensation? What do the new rules tell us about the under-
lying conception of which people, or areas, warrant support or 'invest-
ment'? 
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We are particularly interested in a gender analysis of these policies. 
Thus, we examine parallel trends and issues in each policy area related to 
delivery, eligibility and benefits and demonstrate gendered assumptions 
and impacts. While the Keynesian welfare state had some universal bene-
fits, it rested on a male-breadwinner model, with benefits for women 
largely dependent on their relationship to a male earner. The new welfare 
state rests on an individual employability model that masquerades as 
gender neutral, despite the reality of men's and women's different options 
and responsibilities. When programs target deserving 'individuals' for 
privileged access to training, licenses or income support, gendered norms 
skew who benefits and who is sidelined by these policies (Porter 2003; 
MacDonald 1999; Neis and Grzetic 2005; Power and Harrison 2005). 
Gender inequalities in the labour market and in the reproductive sphere 
are not always taken into account. The new policies also emphasize 
poverty reduction not income security. Therefore, eligibility is more often 
conditional on income testing, usually based on family income, which 
reduces women's economic independence and overlooks intra-household 
inequality (Himmelweit 2002; MacDonald 1998). Further, entitlement in 
a social investment state context is increasingly via one's children, 
sidelining women's rights and needs (Dobrowolsky and Jenson 2004; 
McKeen and Porter 2003). 
The analysis below looks at the "fit" between the policy changes and 
the reality of the Newfoundland and Labrador coastal economy and its 
place within processes of interactive restructuring. In a neo-liberal or a 
social investment framework the rural communities and their inhabitants 
we are studying are problematic. They are seen as drags on, not contribu-
tors to, the overall economy by the national policy community 
(MacDonald 2005). The model and/or assumptions of "adjustment" that 
underlie many policies do not fit rural economic realities. Insufficient 
attention is paid to how the focus on targeting and efficiency interacts 
with resource degradation, resource management, occupational health 
and, more broadly, with power relations in rural communities and 
between communities and corporations. Also neglected are embedded-
ness issues including potential conflicts between individual or corporate 
sustainability and community sustainability. Implicit urban norms and 
behavioural expectations permeate these policies. The seasonal and the 
self-employed workers fall outside the pale of "deserving" unemployed. 
Furthermore, policies aimed at individual adjustment typically fail to take 
account of the household context in which one is embedded and by which 
one is constrained (HRDC 1996a). This is particularly an issue in rural 
communities where one's economic options are severely constrained by 
distance, where forced mobility for one household member can mean 
mobility for the whole household, where plant closures or substantial 
outmigration from an area can drastically undermine the value of equity 
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investments in homes and infrastructure, and where the absence of public 
and private services reinforces reliance on informal family and commu-
nity support (MacDonald 2005). For all these reasons such policies may 
work badly in rural and remote coastal areas. 
Finally, we discuss interactions and contradictions amongst the three 
policy areas, as people struggle to maneuver through the rules for fish-
eries management, EI and workers compensation. For example, fishing 
practices (including when, where, with whom, and how one fishes) are 
influenced by license/access policies, professionalization rules, and EI 
regulations. For example, license upgrading requires professionalization 
which includes training, but training has been cut back, is increasingly 
tied to EI eligibility and is subject to judgments about the investment 
merits of each candidate. Likewise, workers compensation is supposed to 
compensate injured and ill workers for time loss, medical costs, and 
labour market re-entry (where deemed eligible), yet pressure to maintain 
EI eligibility may drive seasonal workers to forego applying for workers 
compensation, thus hiding unsafe working conditions and work-related 
injuries and diseases. Critically, understanding these interactions requires 
understanding the household and community context in which individual 
livelihood choices are made (Connelly and MacDonald, 1992). 
EI and Fisheries 
Changes and Themes 
From the beginning of the neo-liberal reform era, the unemployment 
insurance program, a key element of the Keynesian state, was a major 
focus of attack.3 As well as being expensive, it was seen to interfere with 
market efficiency and adjustment. From 1977 onwards (but accelerating 
in the early 1990s) changes were made consistent with the emerging 
supply-side focus: cuts were made to benefit rates and duration (1978, 
1993,1994), higher entrance requirements were introduced (1977,1994), 
especially for new entrants/re-entrants (NERE) (1978), benefit levels 
began to be tied to having dependent children (1994), the state withdrew 
its funding contribution to the program (1990), and money was shifted 
from "passive" income support to "active" employment measures (1977, 
1990). The consolidation of this neo-liberal direction was the change to 
EI in 1996 (Porter 2003; MacDonald 1999; Pulkingham 1998). This 
reform played a major role in paying down the federal government's 
deficit, it emphasized employability and individual responsibility for 
unemployment, it created a complex incentive structure designed to 
encourage labour force attachment and punish dependency,4 and it 
became more targeted (e.g. to low income families with children and to 
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full-time workers). The EI reform was designed to increase efficiency by 
meeting the competitive needs of employers (decreasing premiums, 
supporting labour flexibility). 
In the post-deficit era some of the more contentious aspects of the EI 
reform were altered. Most notably, the penalties for repeat users were 
dropped (2000) and pilot projects were introduced in 2005 to experiment 
with alternative benefit formulas and reduced penalties for new 
entrants/re-entrants. These changes are intended to fine-tune the incentive 
structure for both employees and employers and to improve the fit 
between income support and the labour market. This ongoing tinkering 
with EI reflects the emergence of a social investment mentality, with its 
attempt to refocus on social needs, in the context of supporting the 
market. The changes to training are another aspect of EI consistent with a 
social investment approach. While investment in training is emphasized, 
training support is based on an assessment of a person's investment 
worthiness and ability to personally contribute to the investment. 
Furthermore, access to training is now largely tied to EI eligibility, 
reflecting the selectivity typical of a social investment approach. Finally, 
the EI Family Supplement, which gives higher benefits to low income 
families with dependent children, reflects the social investment state's 
focus on children. This supplement is also fully integrated with the 
National Child Benefit and reflects the increased use of tax-based benefits 
characteristic of this approach. 
The 1996 EI reform also included changes to fishing benefits, intended 
to reduce expenditures.5 While embodying many of the core elements of 
the changes to regular EI aimed at cost saving, increased work effort and 
labour adjustment (e.g. a benefit formula that averages earnings over an 
arbitrary minimum number of weeks, increased eligibility requirements 
for NERE, and penalties for frequent users), there are key differences. 
The changes to fishing benefits were influenced not only by the Social 
Security Review process but also by reviews of fishery policy. The 1993 
Report of the Task Force on Incomes and Adjustments in the Atlantic 
Fishery (Cashin 1993) argued that an earnings-based insurance program 
would distort fishing effort less than the weekly-based UI system and this 
was adopted in the EI reform.6 There was also a change to duration with 
the introduction of two seasons, with overlapping qualifying periods, and 
fixed benefit periods (maximum 26 weeks, October 1 -June 15, or April 1-
Decemberl5). 
Coastal Reality 
Primary industries, the Atlantic region and seasonal workers were all 
identified during the 1994 Social Security Review as heavy users of the 
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UI system. Particular attention was paid to the issue of frequent 
claimants, for whom UI was argued to constitute a program of income 
supplementation rather than insurance (HRDC 1994: 19).7 The EI reform 
met with considerable opposition from rural representatives and groups 
who felt they were being unfairly targeted and penalized for labour 
market conditions over which they had little control. Our research in 
coastal communities in Newfoundland and Labrador substantiates their 
concerns. 
The main complaint of seasonal workers, including those in fish 
processing, is with how benefit amounts and duration are calculated under 
EI. The incentive structure of the program assumes workers are able to 
increase their work effort, and punishes them for low hours, irregular or 
seasonal work. The change in the formula for calculating average insured 
earnings (using last 26 weeks, with minimum divisor) reduced the bene-
fits of those with gaps in employment, or weeks with low earnings. In our 
high unemployment study area, average earnings are calculated over a 
minimum of 14 weeks. Workers with less seniority lose out in the scram-
ble for weeks and employers who cannot offer 14 good weeks have trou-
ble attracting workers. EI, like UI, has struggled with the challenge to 
maintain work incentives for seasonal workers in the shoulder season. 
While the provision (2003) to ignore 'small weeks' (with earnings < 
$150) has helped, some penalties still exist for workers with fluctuating 
hours and/or earnings.8 The intensity rule, where benefit rates were 
reduced based on previous EI claims, also disproportionately affected 
rural workers, given their greater reliance on UI/EI. The options for rural 
workers (and employers) to respond to such incentives are limited. 
The change to using hours, rather than weeks to determine eligibility 
for regular EI benefited seasonal workers as a whole.9 However, the 910-
hour NERE eligibility rule poses a serious threat to workers in coastal 
communities as it is unrealistic to achieve those hours in most seasonal 
jobs they can access locally. This creates great pressure to stay on the 
work/EI cycle, even if it means taking health risks or migrating for 
temporary work. Furthermore, the continued lack of EI coverage for the 
self-employed who work outside of fishing is a problem, as self-employ-
ment is a particularly important alternative employment option in restruc-
turing rural areas.10 
In our Coasts Under Stress household interviews, EI focus groups, and 
key informant interviews, we heard many examples of these issues. 
Overall, we found that the 1996 changes to EI have interacted with the 
changes in work opportunities in coastal communities to make it harder to 
make a living. EI is thus out of sync with the reality for coastal workers. 
Of particular concern is how interactive restructuring has created just the 
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kind of work that EI punishes. For example, overall fish processing has 
become more seasonal, and seasons are shorter; work has become more 
intermittent for many people; as opportunities decline in fish processing 
more people are turning to the service sector and self-employment.1 x One 
employer commented that "EI is doing more to create out-migration than 
the downturn in the fishery." Access to training has deteriorated as the 
social investment state narrowly links training to EI and to judgments 
about 'good investments' that sideline the aging coastal workforce. The 
loss of local service also is particularly felt in this area, where lower 
education levels make it difficult for people to access computer-based 
self-service options. 
The impact of the EI reform has been more mixed for fishing benefits. 
Overall there has been an increase in claims and benefits, especially in 
Newfoundland. In 2001-02,43% of Canada's fishing claims were made 
in Newfoundland, home to only 26.5% of fishers.12 There is general 
agreement that the change to earnings-based eligibility fits the nature of, 
fishing better than the previous program. The increase in claims also 
reflects the relatively low earnings levels required to qualify compared to 
the high value of landings for some species since the reform. For exam-
ple, 96% of fishers qualify with more than the minimum earnings 
(HRSDC 2004: 61). Furthermore, there is now more flexibility in terms 
of when EI can be collected, with the possibility of two claims per year. 
The number of fishers making two claims a year has increased eight fold 
since 1997-98 (HRSDC 2004: 62). One fisher commented that "the 
unemployment system have got (sic) real kind to the fishermen." Another 
said "When they come out with that Employment Insurance for fishermen 
I thought we wrote it up our self (sic)." This may relate to a small rebound 
in the number of fishers (compared to levels in the early 1990s), despite 
efforts to reduce numbers of fishers through license buybacks and profes-
sionalization, discussed below. 
However, not all fishers are so enthusiastic, as not all have access to the 
high value fisheries and many are struggling to survive based on small 
quotas and low landings from depleted stocks. The main complaint they 
have about fishing EI relates to the fixed period for claims, with concern 
that the "season" as dictated by EI does not coincide with the reality of the 
fishing season - EI runs out before the season opens or it is safe to go out on 
the water in some situations. A winter claim started in December runs out in 
April. You can't keep an open claim, and you may have no other source of 
income. In this situation, there is pressure to get out on the water when it 
isn't safe. For the families where women fish with their husbands, there are 
no other jobs or non-fishing EI claims to fall back on during these periods. 
The divided reactions to fishing EI reflect differentiation within the fishery 
in terms of access, alternative employment and family situation. 
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Gender 
The EI reform of 1996 has been shown to have negatively affected 
women more than men (Pulkingham 1998; MacDonald 1999; Porter 
2003; HRDC 1996b), given gendered paid work patterns. The change to 
hours-based eligibility and the formula for calculating weeks of benefits 
hurt those working 15-35 hours per week - a group in which women 
predominate. The implicit norm of the program - the 'deserving' unem-
ployed - is a full-time, full-year worker. This is more a male than a 
female norm although in the fishing industry it is definitely not a norm for 
either, in the wake of the sale of the offshore trawlers and closure of the 
year-round plants. The incentive structure of the program encourages and 
rewards longer hours and multiple job holding, which are more difficult 
for women, given their greater unpaid work responsibilities. While many 
seasonal workers gained eligibility, as they no longer had to work a mini-
mum number of weeks, seasonal workers with low earnings or less than 
30 hours per week (disproportionately women) lost significantly in terms 
of eligibility under EI (de Raaf et al. 2003). The gender division of labour 
and the seniority systems in fish plants have been linked to some ongoing 
differences in the work hours available to men and women. Historically, 
women were more heavily concentrated in seasonal processing labour 
forces including crab processing, while year-round plants were more 
male-dominated. Now all processing work is seasonal and there is some 
indication that in the labour forces for the newer crab and shrimp process-
ing plants, the proportion of male workers is higher than in older plants 
(Howse et al. 2006) 
Another gender issue has been the enforcement of the 'arm's-length' 
criterion regarding the nature of the employment relation.13 While this 
predated the change from UI to EI, enforcement seems to have increased. 
Under this criterion, women who work in family businesses have their EI 
claims challenged. They are suspected of not 'really working.' This is 
particularly an issue for coastal communities like those we are studying 
where women often hire family members to care for their children and 
where women are fishing with their husbands.14 The EI challenges to 
women fishing feed off of social biases against doing non-traditional 
work. Women who fish with their husbands may also be.seen as replacing 
other workers or getting double EI for their households. Such divisions in 
communities have been heightened in the context of restructuring and 
declining employment opportunities for women and men in most commu-
nities. EI reinforces such divisions (Grzetic 2004). 
A final gender issue is the switch to using family, not individual, 
income as the basis for determining eligibility for the Family Supplement 
for those with dependent children (previously the Dependency Rate). 
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Many married women lost eligibility for this extra benefit as a result of 
this change. Most feminist analysts agree that women gain most when 
benefits are based on individual incomes (MacDonald 1998; Himmelweit 
2002). Targeting based on family income assumes equal income sharing 
within households and equal access to labour market income - neither of 
which can be assumed to exist in contemporary coastal communities or 
elsewhere in Canada for that matter. As the social investment state 
focuses more on investments in children and using the tax system to 
deliver benefits, this issue takes on heightened importance. 
Fisheries Management 
Changes and Themes 
Since (at least) the 1980s, the federal government has moved away from 
heavy involvement in direct responsibility for fisheries science and 
management and from the state-funded 'modernization' schemes of the 
1950s and 1960s, and towards what might be called a more neo-liberal 
approach that has focused on privatization, economic efficiency, individ-
ual responsibility and conservation. Starting in the 1970s the Canadian 
government began to tighten up access to fisheries more than in the past 
by introducing limited entry licensing in some fisheries, and through the 
introduction of Enterprise Allocation (EA), Individual Quota (IQ) and 
eventually Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) programs. Privatizing 
and 'marketizing' fishing rights is considered by many to be the most 
effective way to resolve two iinked problems: the economic problem of 
overcapacity/inefficiency and the environmental problem of overfishing 
(Mansfield 2004).15 Coinciding with the collapse and eventual closure of 
Newfoundland's groundfish fisheries, by the late 1980s the federal 
government began to introduce a series of programs intended to 'adjust' 
fishers out of the fisheries and/or to maintain incomes during the process. 
This began with the Atlantic Fisheries Adjustment Program (AFAP), 
moved on to the Northern Cod Adjustment Program (NCARP, which 
provided opportunities for early retirement, retraining and license buy 
backs) with the beginning of the northern cod moratorium in 1992, and 
was followed by The Atlantic Groundfish Strategy (TAGS) which 
concluded in 1998 (Schrank 2005). By 2002, the total number of fishers 
had dropped to around 15,000 from about 25,000 in the very early 1990s 
(DFO 2005(a)) - a reduction that appears to have been primarily linked to 
the elimination of part-time, registered fishers (Dunne 2003). 
In the post-moratorium phase the assigning of property rights by DFO 
has been mediated by other programs including a professionalization 
program and a program to distinguish between core and non-core 
harvesters with access to some licenses limited to those with core status.16 
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In 1996, DFO reorganized licensing and created 'core' and 'non-core' 
statuses.17 The core license program has effectively capped the number of 
fishers, as there will be no new core-licenses offered. The only way to 
achieve core status is to purchase an existing core enterprise. 
The assignment of core status - aimed at reducing effort - has gone 
hand in hand with the 'professionalization' of the fishery - aimed at limit-
ing access and improving livelihoods for those remaining. Some existing 
fishers were grandfathered into one of the professionalization levels, 
while new entrants must pass through a series of levels in order to qualify 
for Level II Professional Fish Harvester status. In order for harvesters not 
grandfathered into Level II to qualify for Level II status, they must have 
passed previous levels (apprentice and Level 1), must have a total of 120 
education credits (with one credit being approximately equal to 1 day of 
training), and must have 5 years of full-time fishing activity. They must 
then demonstrate full-time fishing activity, and may not go more than two 
years without having 75% of their income come from fishing during the 
fishing season (May 1-October 1) (PFHCB 2005). This requirement 
limits the previous 'occupational pluralism' exhibited by many fishers in 
order to make ends meet and is meant to limit access to fishing incomes 
by those whose primary employment is in other sectors. Only Level II 
Professional Fish Harvesters have the right to purchase or own core enter-
prises. The 1980s also saw Government begin to "promote the independ-
ence of inshore fishers and to limit the concentration of ownership of 
fishing licenses" (DFO 2004). 
More recently, management initiatives have begun placing more 
emphasis on individual responsibility through the introduction of joint 
stewardship and expressed commitment to the devolution of responsibil-
ity for management (though not always authority) to 'self-reliant' user 
groups (DFO 2001, 2004). Indeed, 'self-reliance' was established as one 
of two core objectives in the Atlantic Fisheries Policy Review of 2004 
(DFO 2004).18 This change is consistent with the move to a social invest-
ment discourse within government as a whole. Taken together individual 
quotas, professionalization, and devolution of management responsibili-
ties represent a form of social investment: the assigning of property rights 
through IQs (and similar programs) is thought to create a vested interest 
in conservation; professionalization ensures that harvesters have the 
knowledge required to manage sustainably, efficiently and safely and that 
their incomes are not jeopardized by competition from "non-professional" 
fish harvesters or "moon-lighters;" and that the opportunity to sell quotas 
and licenses gives harvesters a "pension". As with other social invest-
ments, the role of government is seen to be mediating amongst competing 
claims on scarce investment dollars. A further change that fits with a 
social investment framework is the shifting of financial responsibility and 
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management of surveillance (e.g., dock-side monitoring and fisheries 
observers), fisheries management (integrated management plans) and 
infrastructure such as harbours and wharves, to fish harvesters and fish-
ery-dependent communities (e.g., Coastal Communities Network 2004). 
Harvesters, and to a lesser degree their communities, have taken on these 
extra social and financial obligations during a period of major industrial 
restructuring, high scientific uncertainty and pressure for conservation. 
Coastal Reality 
In some sense, between 1990 and 2002, there was an improvement in the 
economic condition of inshore fishers. Prior to the groundfish declines, 
the under 65 foot fleet was responsible for 58% of landed value, a 
percentage that increased to 70% of the value of a fishery that, in 2002, 
was worth more than it had been previously (Dunne 2003). The average 
net fishing income of fishers increased 176% (from $4,287 to $11,831) 
between 1990 and 2001. Averages, however, tell only part of the story. 
As fisheries become more capital intensive and costly, participation 
becomes more and more contingent on access to wealth or to employment 
by someone with an enterprise. It is clear that this viability and these rela-
tionships vary with fleet sector, license type and geographic area. 
Earnings on the west coast (4R3Pn), for example, are lower than else-
where and earnings have not improved in the under 35 foot fleet as much 
as they have in the 35-65 foot class (Dunne 2003). Likewise, earnings in 
the snow crab fishery for those with full-time or supplementary licenses 
(and therefore access to higher quotas) have been much higher than those 
with "inshore" licenses. The status of one's fishing license directly 
dictates who receives any of the benefits from the crab fisheiy. Most of 
the allocations go to Core license holders in the under 65 foot crab fish-
ery, and most of the increases in shrimp quotas have gone to Core license 
holders in the 45-65 foot category (Dunne 2003). This directly results in 
differential benefits. Similar gaps exist between skipper owner-operators 
and crew. Schrank (2005) has suggested that while a skipper and owner 
of a 65 foot fishing vessel can earn up to $100,000 annually from crab 
fishing alone, crew members earn in the $22,000 range. Those with 
smaller 'inshore' licenses, with much smaller quotas, would earn much 
less than this.19 
The differential benefits flowing to these different fleet segments have 
contributed to social differentiation (see Sinclair 1987, Palmer and 
Sinclair 1995 for a discussion of the historical roots of differentiation in 
the Northern Gulf cod fishery). Power (2005) has suggested that differen-
tiation has also occurred at an individual level, as distinctions are increas-
ingly drawn between who is and who is not a 'genuine' fisher. Stories 
abound of 'genuine' fishers who somehow fell through the cracks and 
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were awarded what they feel to be inappropriate status, leading to inap-
propriate exclusion from fishing benefits (Power 2005). This is partly a 
result of the poor fit between federal policy frameworks and the complex 
sets of relations at the local level that structured fishing behaviour in the 
past. 
The overall population in fishery-dependent rural areas of 
Newfoundland is both declining and ageing. In interviews and feedback 
sessions with fish harvesters and community members in rural communi-
ties, a message that recurs time and again is fear about the future. For 
example, of 34 surveyed fishers asked if they had encouraged their chil-
dren to fish, 30 said ho. When we asked about the next generation in 
interviews and discussions with harvesters and others in fishing commu-
nities, we were often told 'there won't be one'. Out-migration rates are 
high, as more and more young people leave rural communities, searching 
for greater opportunities elsewhere. Even those in the 35-65 feet vessel 
category are not benefiting as much as they appear to on the surface. 
Respondents have indicated that costs have increased over the last several 
years, particularly with respect to insurance and fuel. Licensing fees, 
observer costs and monitoring fees have also increased as a result of the 
devolution of costs and responsibility by the Department of Fisheries and 
Oceans (DFO) onto industry. Limited entry licensing, IQs and ITQs have 
produced a market in access rights, driving up the cost of access to the 
point where owner-operators are being forced into so-called "trust agree-
ments" with processors that are compromising the owner-operator princi-
ple, seriously limiting the access of future generations of small operators 
to the fishery and contributing to the pressure to fish unsustainably 
(Praxis 2005). Overall, a recent comprehensive study of the owner-opera-
tor portion of Canada's fisheries found that "the small business founda-
tion of the industry is under severe stress. Shifting and sometimes 
inconsistent management approaches and dramatic changes in markets 
for fishing licenses and quotas are rapidly undermining the owner-opera-
tor fishery and the social and economic sustainability of coastal commu-
nities." (Praxis 2005: 2-3). 
Returning to the oft-expressed concern that "...the Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) has suffered from a policy schizophrenia, 
never being able to determine whether its chief goal is to set and imple-
ment policy for the fishery as a viable industry or whether it is to maxi-
mize employment and save non-viable rural communities" (Schrank 
1995: 291), we question why these two goals should be seen as mutually 
exclusive. The problem may not be with contradictory policy goals 
(economic viability versus employment support) but with the application 
of a particular economic model that privileges short-term economic effi-
ciency and maximizes private returns in an industry where such market 
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principles have repeatedly threatened the long-term sustainability of the 
resource - and hence livelihoods. It seems the tragedy of the commons is 
being replaced by the tragedy of the market in coastal Newfoundland and 
Labrador. On the other hand, it is possible to use privatization in conjunc-
tion with community management, as long as groups, not just individuals, 
are assigned property rights (Mansfield 2004, McCay 2004), though it 
should be noted that the assignment of allocations in this fashion would 
challenge purely market-based approaches to resource use (Mansfield 
2004). 
Gender 
In the harvesting sector, women have long struggled to have their contri-
butions to the fishery recognized. Fishing work has been defined in terms 
of the male roles associated with being in the boat. Women's support 
work on shore - making and marketing fish - has been ignored when 
crucial decisions are made about who is, and is not, a fisher. This has been 
true with UI, TAGS and licensing and professionalization policies. Granting 
of core status was based on historic attachment and dependence on the 
fishery, and one had to be the head of a fishing enterprise to be granted 
core status. Historic attachment meant being on the boat and owning the 
enterprise and licenses. Professionalization individualizes involvement 
in the fishery which has, historically, been family-based. The meanings 
and definitions associated with professionalization tend to be gendered 
and exclusive. Early in the restructuring process, a professional fish 
harvester was defined as a "fisherman who is experienced, highly-skilled 
and well-trained ... fishes for the full season and is involved in the 
management and development of the fishery through fishermen's organ-
izations" (Cashin 1993: 68-69). This definition ignores the relationship 
between fish harvesters and communities and households, and deter-
mines who will and who will not be considered a 'serious' fish harvester. 
As Power (2005: 130) has put it, "(t)he current criteria used to determine 
legitimate harvesters and the methods of distributing access to resources 
via individual quotas have served to reinforce a history of male privilege 
and to solidify corporate interests." Given their family responsibilities, 
women face particular challenges around accessing the training needed 
to qualify for professionalization, especially if training is not available 
locally. Gender norms also restrict their access to the informal (on-the-
job) training that they need in order to be safe on the water and to 
advance in professionalization so they can eventually hold fishing 
licenses (Grzetic 2004). 
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The Workers Compensation System 
Changes and Themes 
The history of workers compensation in Newfoundland and Labrador 
since 1990 is similar to that of EI and Fisheries Management policy 
change in that it reflects a shift from essentially voluntary, arm's-length 
management, through neo-liberal cost-cutting and marketization, to an 
introduction of social investment themes. Relative to other Canadian 
provinces, Newfoundland and Labrador was slow to establish a collec-
tive, compulsory, no-fault compensation system for work-related injuries, 
diseases and fatalities. Relevant legislation was not introduced until after 
confederation with Canada in 1949. Here as elsewhere in the industrial-
ized countries, there was a wave of occupational health and safety (OHS) 
reforms between the late 1960s and the 1980s. These reforms were gener-
ally based on four basic principles: 1) employer responsibility for hazard 
control with a focus on engineering and prevention versus just managing 
workers' behaviour; 2) regulatory reform emphasizing improved stan-
dards, clearer legislation and better enforcement efforts directed at health 
and safety; 3) a focus on worker participation as a right and to improve 
efficiency; and 4) the creation and dissemination of OHS knowledge as a 
means to promote change. With these reforms, while it was understood 
that employers had a legal obligation to limit OHS hazards, the approach 
was largely based on voluntary rather than mandatory implementation, 
primarily driven by reactive enforcement and later by a focus on OHS 
knowledge development and reliance on OHS professionals and stan-
dards driven by research and investigations (Frick and Wren 2000). When 
occupational injury, disease or death occurred, workers forfeited their 
right to sue in exchange for access to a no-fault compensation system 
funded by employer premiums. However, Newfoundland and Labrador 
faced numerous OHS challenges including limited access to medical 
services in many rural and remote areas, extremely limited inspection and 
enforcement capacity, and a policy framework that tended to emphasize 
jobs and safety over health (Rennie, 2005). 
In the 1980s, the costs of injuries and related employer assessment rates 
in Newfoundland and Labrador expanded rapidly until, by 1990, two actu-
arial studies had indicated the compensation system was at risk of falling 
apart. In 1993, a number of neo-liberal changes to the compensation 
system that reduced overall benefits and sought to target benefit payments 
to a smaller proportion of injured and disabled workers were implemented. 
Benefit rates fell from 90% of net earnings to 75% for the first 39 weeks 
and 80% thereafter (Discussion Paper, Task Force Report on the Workers 
Compensation Commission 2001: Appendix 1, pg. 2). Indexing of long-
term disability payments was temporarily frozen and average premiums 
increased. The practice of "deeming" (withdrawal of benefits from work-
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ers deemed capable of work whether or not they had a job) also increased 
during the 1990s. "Deeming", which was a form of targeting and a mecha-
nism for encouraging claimants to return to work, resulted in a lot of criti-
cism as workers lost income because employers generally did not have in 
place appropriate return to work opportunities and workers often had diffi-
culty accessing alternative employment. Also during the 1990s, the 
Commission introduced experience-based rating, an approach to premium-
setting that identifies employers with injury costs higher than the average 
in their rate group and assigns them higher premiums, targeting compensa-
tion costs towards employers with the worst claims record. 
In 1998, the Commission assumed responsibility for health and safety 
education and accident prevention and was renamed the Newfoundland 
and Labrador Workplace Health Safety and Compensation Commission 
(WHSCC). This social investment in education and prevention was in 
response to the 2001 Task Force Report that recommended greater atten-
tion to prevention as the only way to address ongoing serious fiscal 
threats. It identified serious shortcomings in OHS training within schools 
and on the job, as well as with joint health and safety committees and 
worker representatives on those committees. While supporting the "inter-
nal responsibility" approach to OHS, the Report called for the develop-
ment of a comprehensive prevention strategy including more rigorous 
enforcement of joint committee requirements, mandatory training and 
monitoring of joint committee operations by government. In addition, the 
Report called for the introduction of an Early and Safe Return to Work 
program with legislated responsibilities for employers and workers, in 
order to reduce the cost of injuries and reliance on vocational retraining 
and "deeming" within the system. The Report also recommended an 
increase in the surcharge ceiling for a higher than average experience-
based rating and the elimination of a minimum benefit provision, which it 
saw as potentially creating a disincentive for some workers to return to 
work (but maintaining it for surviving spouses). Finally, the Report 
recommended more effective inspection for abuse by employers, workers 
and health professionals, supported increased resources in this area, and 
promoted the "abuse" hotline at WHSCC. 
Overall, in Newfoundland and Labrador the social investment shift in 
the area of occupational health and compensation to date has focused on 
the introduction of an early and safe return to work program based on a 
legislated "duty to accommodate" and the implementation of a system for 
monitoring such programs, with penalties for noncompliant workers and 
employers. Although experience-based rating is still in place in the 
system, the penalty surcharge has been increased to 40% in response to 
the recommendations of the Task Force Report (2001). More recently, 
the WHSCC has introduced a package of reforms that it calls PRIME 
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(Prevention, Return to Work and Insurance Management for Employers 
and Employees). The PRIME program offers a 5% average premium 
refund to employers who meet certain health and safety and return to 
work requirements (so-called practice incentive) and, to those who meet 
this first set of requirements, a second level refund based on accident 
costs (the so-called experience incentive). The PRIME program is being 
phased in between 2005 and 2008. In general, companies are being 
offered financial incentives to introduce elements of an occupational 
health and safety management system including some structures that are 
required by law but might not currently exist, such as joint health and 
safety committees. 
Coastal Reality 
Environmental and industrial restructuring and changes in fisheries 
management policies have contributed to changes in targeted species, the 
location of fishing, owner-worker relations, as well as vessel size and 
design. These changes have had consequences on the nature and scale of 
occupational risk exposures in the Newfoundland and Labrador fishing 
industry (Dolan et al. 2005) as well as on prevention and compensation. 
In the late 1980s, a substantial proportion of compensation claims for fish 
harvesters came from the deep-sea trawler sector. Claims from both this 
sector and from the small boat coastal sector declined in the early 1990s 
in response to the moratorium. In 2000, the Canadian Coast Guard (DFO, 
2000) conducted a fishing vessel safety review in response to an apparent 
increase in the rate of fishing incidents in Newfoundland and Labrador in 
the late 1990s (primarily from the <65 foot fleets). The review incorpo-
rated Search and Rescue (SAR) incident data, workers' compensation 
claims data and DFO fisheries data from 1993 to 1999. The authors 
concluded that workers compensation claims and Search and Rescue 
(SAR) incidents were on the rise in the Newfoundland fishing industry 
during that period. Pelot (2000) showed that the mean distance of activity 
from shore had noticeably increased for the 35-45 foot and 45-65 foot 
length classes (linked to an expansion and changes in the snow crab fish-
ery) and that the incident rates as measured by the ratio between fishing 
activity and the number of Search and Rescue incidents were highest in 
the 35-45 foot length class. Furthermore, a recent Transportation Safety 
Board comparative analysis of fatality rates across multiple 
Newfoundland and Labrador industrial sectors using workers' compensa-
tion claims showed that the fatality rate of 0.619 per 1000 among fish 
harvesters was the highest of any sector. This rate was almost twice that 
of the second highest sector (construction at 0.373) and more than seven 
times the average rate across all sectors (Steven Henderson, Research 
Analyst, Macro Analysis Division, Transportation Safety Board of 
Canada, Personal Communication, October 2006). 
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SàfetyNet focus groups with fish harvesters in the <65 foot fleet indi-
cate that many accidents and injuries are not reported to either Search and 
Rescue or the WHSCC (Power et al. 2005). Short seasons for high value 
fisheries can discourage harvesters from filing claims and encourage 
them to take risks. Injured harvesters often keep working as long as they 
can during the short fishing seasons and also tend to help each other out if 
a vessel gets in trouble rather than calling in SAR. In interviews and focus 
groups harvesters talked about the new risks associated with the shift 
from cod to snow crab. These were related to a poor fit between their 
training and experience, the types of safety equipment they had on board, 
the design of their vessels and the demands and risks associated with crab 
fishing (Power et al. 2005). 
More and more comprehensive regulations designed to promote fish-
ing safety are being introduced. These have been integrated into the 
professionalization process described above and tend to focus on knowl-
edge and use of safety equipment as well as what to do in the event of an 
emergency. The courses can entail substantial costs for fish harvesters. 
In terms offish and shellfish processing, environmental and industrial 
restructuring from groundfish to shellfish, supported by a policy commit-
ment to downsize the processing sector, have resulted in reductions in the 
number of plants and processing workers and, as in fishing, an increase in 
the overall seasonality of employment (O'Rielly 2004). A total of 27,154 
accidents were reported to the WHSCC by fish processing workers 
between 1985 and 1998. The incidence rate for reported accidents 
(number of reported accidents per average number of workers/month) for 
these years declined from a high of 30/100 workers in 1987 to a low of 
12/100 workers in the mid-1990s, increasing again to 17/100 in 1998 
(Neis et al. 2001). Lower incidence of compensation claims in the mid-
1990s may only reflect a reduction in the duration of work-related expo-
sure overall. However, fewer claims to the WHSCC probably also reflect 
the combined impact of increased seasonality and EI dependency on acci-
dent and injury reporting. Seasonal workers rely heavily on EI for their 
economic survival. Time off on compensation does not count towards EI 
eligibility. Although the EI Act says that if a person is unable to work due 
to an injury or illness, and can provide documentation stating so, their 
qualifying period will be extended by the number of weeks lost due to 
illness (HRSDC 2005), injured or ill workers who are struggling to get the 
minimum number of weeks to qualify, and who are uncertain of employ-
ment the following year, are unlikely to file claims for compensation 
unless this is absolutely necessary. 
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Gender 
Men were more concentrated than women in the year-round, deep-sea 
plants and offshore trawlermen were exclusively male in the 1980s, prior 
to the cod collapse. The virtual elimination of the trawler fishery in the 
1990s removed most of the year-round jobs from the sector. During the 
1990s, men's jobs became more like women's jobs in the 1980s in terms 
of seasonality, employment uncertainty and exposures to health and 
safety risks. In fishing and in fish processing, men and women tend to do 
different jobs and thus to have different exposures. While women made 
up 20% of registered fish harvesters in 2000 (Grzetic 2004), they 
accounted for only 4.8% of lost time claims for workers in fish harvesting 
and fish farming. However, the proportion of lost time claims filed by 
women increased from 39/2011 or 1.9% of lost time claims in the five 
year period between 1989 and 1993 to 73 claims or 7.9% of lost time 
claims in the 5 year period between 2000 and 2004 (Charles Coady, 
WHSCC, Personal Communication, June 21, 2005). An analysis of 
processing workers' compensation claims for the period from 1985-1998 
found that while women made up slightly more than 50% of processing 
workers overall in the industry during this period, they were more likely 
to work in seasonal plants and with shellfish than men. Women process-
ing workers submitted only 28.6% of accident claims between 1985 and 
1998. However, the ratio of claims filed by women processing workers 
relative to men increased over this period from .27 in the late 1980s to .35 
between 1993 and 1998 (Neis et al. 2001). Overall, the proportion of 
'medical aid' and 'report only' claims relative to 'lost time' claims also 
increased for women and for men which may reflect less serious injuries 
but, based on our interviews, may also reflect less willingness to take time 
off work in an increasingly seasonal industry. 
Occupational asthma and allergy are important occupational health 
risks associated with snow crab processing. Worker health assessments 
carried out among workers in four Newfoundland and Labrador plants 
found that female study participants were more likely than male partici-
pants to be diagnosed as almost certain/highly probable snow crab occu-
pational asthma and allergy sufferers and to have higher median 
cumulative exposures to the sensitizing proteins associated with these 
occupational illnesses. This study also found that workers with breathing 
problems were unlikely to have filed claims for these problems (Howse et 
al. 2006). 
While this requires more research, there are indications from Coasts 
Under Stress and SafetyNet research that recent shifts in WHSCC 
policy towards experience-based rating and early and safe return to 
work programs have been associated with pressure from employers to 
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not file claims and to return to work early. For example, in our Coasts 
Under Stress research, we heard about attempts to "ease back" women 
workers who are seriously allergic to shellfish - a questionable and 
potentially risky practice for both the worker and the employer. While it 
is still early days in the PRIME program, there are indications that its 
premium reduction for plants that create and. train joint health and safety 
committees does seem to be encouraging improvements in these areas 
in the processing industry. However, some discussions indicate it may 
also be adding to the incentives for management to challenge claims 
and to discourage reporting. The Discussion Paper prepared by the Task 
Force on the Workers Compensation System commented that, "support-
ers of experience rating maintain that experience rated assessments 
provide a more equitable distribution of injury costs among employers, 
an incentive for prevention programs, and a stimulus for claims 
management programs. Opponents of the programs argue that experi-
ence rating compromises the collective liability principle, encourages 
employers to control costs after an injury has occurred through underre-
porting, and diverts attention away from accident prevention to claims 
cost control." (2001, Appendix 1: ii). The balance between these 
outcomes probably varies between employers and with the relative 
vulnerability and options of different groups of workers. It is significant 
that there have been few claims for occupational allergy and asthma 
among shellfish processing workers in recent years, despite extensive 
efforts to promote awareness of this problem and research indicating 
prevalence could be up to 15% in older plants. 
Interactions amongst Policies 
While different departments and/or levels of government are responsible 
for each of the policies discussed, it is clear from the points of view of 
those on the ground trying to make a living and policy-makers trying to 
reshape the economy, that the policies are interdependent. As the three 
policies share a common neo-liberal underpinning, the cumulative impact 
is to impose a market logic on coastal communities that - as elsewhere -
creates increased differentiation and undermines traditional livelihood 
strategies and options. A common thread of each policy is a focus on 
keeping people working, and the interaction amongst policies intensifies 
this pressure. The policies also share a common focus on the individual 
actor - the unemployed worker, the injured worker, the fisher. However, 
this individual is usually embedded in a household and frequently lives in 
a rural and remote, single industry community, where the cumulative 
effects and interactions amongst policies are felt and acted upon. These 
relationships are generally ignored, though gender norms and family 
stereotypes are implicitly at work. 
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The intersection of EI and fisheries policy is perhaps the most recog-
nized by both policy-makers and analysts. As noted above, changes to 
fishing benefits took account of recommendations of the 1993 fisheries 
task force (Cashin 1993) and stopped basing eligibility on weeks of fish-
ing. There is also evidence that UI/EI policy may influence fisheries 
management policy. For example, one lobster fisher recalled that when 
the number of weeks required for UI increased from 10 to 12 in the early 
1990s the lobster season also had to be increased to 12 weeks ("they were 
basing our lobster fishery on the UI. system"). He noted that now, with the 
changes to fishing EI, the season was down to 8 weeks. 
A common view amongst analysts is that generous UI/EI has worked 
against attempts to rationalize the fishing industry (Schrank 1998b, 2005). 
In this view EI is a subsidy to fish plant workers and fishers. Less 
commonly argued is that, in this logic, it is also a subsidy to the compa-
nies and that in a context of resource scarcity, EI support can help 
harvesters and processors adhere to conservation initiatives necessary for 
the long-term recovery of the resource and the long-term survival of fish-
ery communities. The incentives embedded in fishing UI/EI, along with 
fisheries management regulations, certainly structure fishing efforts and, 
to some degree, OHS risks. The shift to an earnings-based eligibility 
Scheme under EI was partly designed to remove the problem of fishing 
for insured weeks. Under the earnings-based system it is easier for most 
fishers to qualify, partly because of the increased value of landings with 
the switch to shellfish (for those who have access to these species). 
However, the concern now is not pressure for individual fishers to 
increase their effort, but rather that the ease of meeting EI eligibility may 
keep more people in the industry. Differentials in the fit between fishing 
EI arid regular EI and the realities of fishery communities may help 
account for the increase (since the late 1990s) in women and others fish-
ing - particularly since jobs in processing have become scarce, more 
short-term and more precarious, and regular EI rules have made it tough 
to get a decent benefit. The household basis of the fishery - invisible in 
policy - shapes how families work with the changing incentive structures. 
Most fishing families we interviewed experienced some tension 
between EI rules and fisheries management rules. They are concerned 
that the rigid rules about the time frames for receiving fishing EI do not fit 
the regulated fishing seasons, leaving them without income at critical 
times of the year. "This spring there was so many people who didn't have 
any money to start up fishing at all." They are also concerned that the 
possibility for two fishing claims a year reinforces the differentiation 
amongst fishers created by the management regime discussed above. As 
one inshore fisher said, "If you haven't got big boats and big quotas 
where you can catch a lot of, big lot of dollars worth, it's no good to us." 
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Another issue is that taking a job outside the fishery in a bad season - or 
taking a job to augment an EI claim can jeopardize your core fisher status 
despite its potential contribution to conservation. EI encourages multiple 
earning activities, while professionalization demands occupational 
specialization. 
Fisheries management and health and safety policies are closely inter-
connected, The DFO is responsible for fisheries management while 
Transport Canada has primary responsibility for fishing safety in 
Newfoundland and Labrador and elsewhere in Canada. Over the past two 
decades, in Canada as elsewhere, there has been no systematic mecha-
nism in place to monitor and mitigate the potential impact of fisheries 
management initiatives on fishing safety and the health offish harvesters 
(Bornstein et al. 2006; Windle et al. 2008). 
Substantial concern exists about the potential effect of regulations such 
as those limiting vessel length or tightly constraining when gear can be 
deployed and fishing risk. To a growing extent, licenses and quota in 
Newfoundland and Labrador are controlled by processors through so-
called trust agreements that are linked to processor financing of vessel 
costs (Praxis Research 2005). Under the current system, processors pay 
WHSCC premiums on behalf of fish harvesters. As their control over 
harvesting increases, this could influence the amount of pressure 
harvesters experience to take risks and to not report injuries. 
Other potential interactions between fisheries management and OHS 
include the fact that poorly regulated competitive fisheries like the St. 
John Bay lobster fishery (Whalen 2005) create pressure to get out there 
no matter what the state of the weather or your own health. Training for 
safety in fisheries focuses more on vessel safety and emergency response 
than on vessel design from the point of view of daily work and ergonom-
ics; gender differences in training requirements and opportunities are also 
poorly addressed (Grzetic 2004). OHS considerations have not been inte-
grated into fisheries management decision-making although the introduc-
tion of Individual Quotas is often justified in terms of their potential to 
reduce the "race for the fish" and related risk-taking in fishing (Power et 
al. 2005). 
We have noted that EI reforms make access to training more difficult, 
which intersects with the increased emphasis on training in the profes-
sionalization of fishing. While this is sometimes experienced as contra-
dictory (needing training to change status, but being denied training 
support by EI), the cumulative impact is to reinforce the overall goal of 
limiting the numbers of fishers, at the same time as it skews who can and 
can't succeed in the new fishery. Of particular concern is that it reinforces 
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the marginalization of women. Note also that both EI arms length chal-
lenges and fisheries license surveillance undermine the legitimacy of 
women fishers. 
We have heard in our interviews disturbing examples of the intersec-
tion between EI and workers compensation. Maintaining EI eligibility 
often takes precedence over health considerations. Workers are afraid to 
apply for workers compensation for fear of losing out on EI for a season 
or, more importantly, falling into the NERE trap and trying to find 910 
hours of work to get back on the system. As one fisher who injured his 
eye and didn't apply for worker's compensation said " . . . I had to be fish-
ing, I had to make enough to get me EI. I had to stay fishing or I'd been 
stuck all winter with no E I . . . Fishermen got a certain time and that's it -
they can't afford to lose that time." 
Conclusion 
Our case study has illustrated the common underpinnings of these three 
policies that affect the livelihoods of people in coastal communities and 
some of the ways these policies are interacting to affect their livelihood 
strategies and their health. Changes made in each policy from the 1980s 
through the mid-1990s reflect a neo-liberal ideology about the role of 
government and the primacy of the market. Privatization - of fisheries 
resources, of responsibility for health and safety, of delivery of training -
pervades the policies. In the post-deficit era further changes in policies 
are consistent with the social investment state discourse, which recon-
structs social policy to work with and through the market. Terms such as 
social investment, social capital and social economy reflect the new way 
of thinking about social spending. In the initial neo-liberal stage, cuts and 
targeting focused on identifying the 'undeserving;' it could be argued that 
the social investment stage shifts the emphasis to the 'deserving,' with 
renewed spending in some areas and a concern with inclusion and equal 
opportunity. The common thread, however, is targeting, and with that 
comes surveillance, marginalization of some, and a complicated set of 
incentives within and across policies. The social investment state is also a 
'partnering' state, whereby civil society actors (firms, individuals, 
community organizations) participate in the delivery of programs. This 
ethic of individual responsibility shifts the onus away from the state; 
however, power differences amongst these actors - and between them and 
the state - mean the rhetoric of 'participation' is often hollow. The part-
nering state is evidenced in recent trends in fisheries management and in 
the changing regulatory regime for workers compensation. 
Each policy is framed in gender neutral terms, as is the common 
emphasis on employability. However, as we have shown, this masks both 
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underlying gender assumptions and gendered impacts: a gendered labour 
market renders women's work less protected by EI; gender differences in 
occupational hazards contribute to the greater invisibility of women's 
work-related illnesses and injuries; and fisheries management regimes 
privilege traditional male roles in fishing, marginalizing women. 
Employability is the common goal and source of entitlement across the 
policies. There is pressure to be employed, stay employed and return to 
work quickly if injured, even if this endangers worker health in the longer 
term. The interactions amongst the policies discussed above exacerbate 
this pressure, helping maintain a cheap, vulnerable and aging labour force 
in coastal communities. Interactive restructuring - including industrial, 
social and environmental restructuring - has undermined traditional 
livelihood strategies and options and shifted power relations in these 
communities (MacDonald 2005). It has resulted in an increase in precari-
ous forms of employment that are not covered by EI, or are outside of the 
management model on which workers compensation is based. Policy 
restructuring is not simply overlaid on this interactive restructuring; it is 
part of it - affecting not only individual options and behaviour but the 
very shape of the industries on which they depend. 
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Notes 
1. This research took place as part of two large interdisciplinary projects called 
"Coasts Under Stress" (www.coastsunderstress.ca) and "SafetyNet" (www. 
safetynet.mun.ca). 
2. We use the term interactive restructuring to describe the interrelated processes of 
industrial, environmental, social and institutional restructuring. Institutional 
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restructuring includes the changes to policy frameworks and specific policies 
addressed in this paper. These changes are shaped by, and shape the other dimen-
sions of restructuring. 
3. In addition to its social safety net function, UI was part of active Keynesian 
demand stabilization and regional equalization efforts. 
4. For example, in Regular EI the benefit formula (minimum divisor) penalized those 
who qualified with only minimum hours; repeat users were penalized (intensity 
rule, clawback); new entrants and re-entrants (NERE) faced dramatically higher 
eligibility requirements (910 hours). 
5. Fishing benefits were introduced in 1956 amidst considerable controversy to 
provide UI benefits for self-employed fishers - the only group of self-employed to 
be covered. Under UI, eligibility for fishing benefits was based on a system of 
"stamps" tied to weeks of fishing effort (with a minimum earnings value per week) 
which mimicked rules for regular UI. 
6. The 1996 EI reform based eligibility on earnings (minimum of $2,500-$4,200 
from fishing, depending on the unemployment rate). It should be noted that the 
NERE penalty is less severe ($5,500 earnings) for fishing EI than with regular EI. 
7. While seasonal workers claim a disproportionate share of EI, it should be noted 
that almost 40% of seasonal layoffs do not lead to an EI claim (déRaaf et al. 2003). 
There are limits in how much leeway seasonal workers have to respond to program 
incentives. 
8. For example, the 26 week average earnings calculation period creates a disincen-
tive for seasonal workers to take bits of work at different earnings over the course 
of the year. A pilot project (October 2005 - 2008) to use the best 14 weeks of 
employment has been introduced to address this, after years of lobbying (FFAW 
2004). 
9. However seasonal workers (like others) with <30 hours per week lost eligibility. 
10. In rural areas outside of commuting distance from urban centres, the self-employ-
ment rate (28%) is more than double that in urban areas (13%) (duPlessis 2004). 
11 .Tourism, encouraged as an alternative, is particularly challenged by EI regulations 
^ in light of its short season and high incidence of self-employment. 
12. EI figures from the 2002 EI Monitoring and Assessment Report Annex 1 Table 
1.6; fishing labour force statistics from the 2001 census, Cat. No. 
97F0012XCB2001013. (www.statcan.ca). 
13.When a family member is hired it must be established that there is an 'arm's 
length' relationship and the pay and terms are equivalent to what any other 
employee would receive. 
14. Women who fished with their husbands only got the right to a UI claim in their 
own name after a Human Rights decision in 1980. Since then, women's access to 
benefits has been affected by the narrow definition of fishing which omits the 
support work women traditionally do in fishing enterprises. 
15. Mansfield (2004) points to a 'convergence' between the thinking of common prop-
erty theorists and their focus on the benefits of common property (vs. open access 
regimes) with that of neo-classical economics centered on 'rights-based' fishing. 
16. Fishers had been separated as early as 1980 into full-time and part-time categories 
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and differential privileges had been assigned to each category. For example, fish-
ers in the part-time category in 1980 could only fish in vessels up to 22' with hand-
line and jigger (Parsons and Lear, 1993). 
17. Whereas in 1995 there had been 13,070 full time fishers and 7,001 part-time fish-
ers, in 1996 there were only 5,359 core license holders and 12,251 non-core 
license holders (DFO 2005b). 
18. The second principal objective was 'conservation and sustainable use'. 
19. Our respondents in NAFO subdivision 2J in inshore (under 35') crab fishery had 
quotas of around 12,000 lbs in 2004. Those in the supplementary fleet had quotas 
around 110,000 lbs - nearly ten times as much. 
References 
Bornstein, S., Neis, B., Murray, M., Bass, D., Windle, M., Binkley, M., Power, N. and 
Brennan, S. 2006. SafeCatch Final Report. Ottawa: Search and Rescue Secretariat, 
New Initiatives Fund, http://www.safetynet.mun.ca/safecatch.htm. 
Cashin, R. (Chairman) 1993. Task Force on Incomes and Adjustment in the Atlantic 
Fishery, Charting a New Course: Towards the Fishery of the Future. Ottawa: 
Supply and Services Canada. 
Coastal Communities Network 2004. Between the Land and the Sea: The Social and 
Economic Importance of Wharves and Harbours in Nova Scotia. Prepared by 
Praxis Research and Consulting, www.coastalcommunities.ns.ca. 
Community Accounts Newfoundland and Labrador, Labour Market Accounts. 
Census 2001: Occupation by Gender and Age. http://www.communityaccounts.ca/ 
communityaccounts/onlinedata/display_table.asp?whichtabl=table_15r&comval=p 
rov accessed October 28 2008. 
Connelly, P. and MacDonald, M. 1992. State Policy, the Household and Women's 
Work in the Atlantic Fishery. Journal of Canadian Studies 26(4). 
Cossman, B. and Fudge, J. 2002. Introduction. In Privatization, Law and the 
Challenge to Feminism, eds. Cossman, B. and Fudge, J, 3-37. Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press. 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) 2000. Fishing Vessel Safety Review (less 
than 65 feet). St. John's, Maritime Search and Rescue. 2000. 
2001. Fisheries Management Policies on Canada's Atlantic Coast. Accessed 
at: http:///www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/afpr-rppa/FINAL%20-%20ENGLISH%20-%20 
APRIL%202002.pdf. 
2004. Atlantic Fisheries Policy Review. Accessed at: http://www.dfo-
mpo.gc.ca/afpr-rppa/Doc_Doc/policy_framework/policy_framework_e.htm. 
2005 a. Figures accessed June, 2005 at http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/commu-
nic/statistics. 
2005 b. Figures accessed June, 2005 at http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/commu-
nic/lic_pol/ch3_e.htm. 
DeRaaf, S., Kapsalis, C , and Vincent, C. 2003. Seasonal Work and Employment 
Insurance Use. Perspectives on Labour and Income 4(9) (September). 
176 
State Policy, Livelihood Protection 
and Gender on Canada's East Coast 
Dobrowolsky, A. 2004. The Chretien Liberal Legacy and Women: Changing Policy 
Priorities with Little Cause for Celebration. Revue d'études constitutionelles. 
9(1,2): 171-98 
2002. Rhetoric versus Reality: The Figure of the Child and New Labour's 
Strategic 'Social Investment State.' Studies in Political Economy 69:43-73. 
and Jenson, J. 2005. Social Investment Perspectives and Practices: A Decade 
in British Politics. Social Policy Review 17: 203-230. 
2004. Shifting Representation of Citizenship: Canadian Politics of 'Women' 
and 'Children. ' Social Politics 11 (2): 154-80. Summer. 
and Saint-Martin, D. 2005. Agency, Actors and Change in a Child-Focused 
Future: 'Path Dependency' Problematised. Commonwealth and Comparative 
Politics, 43(1): 1-33. 
Dolan, A. H., Taylor, M., Neis, B., Eyles, J., Ommer, R., Schneider, D., Montevecchi, 
B. (2005). "Restructuring and health in Canadian coastal communities: A social-
ecological framework of restructuring and health." Eco-Health. 2: 1-14. 
Dunne, E. (Commissioner) 2003. Fish Processing Policy Review: Final Report. 
December. 
DuPlessis, V. 2004. Self-Employment Activity in Rural Canada. Rural and Small 
Town Analysis Bulletin 5(5) Statistics Canada: Catalogue no. 21-006-XIE. 
Esping-Anderson, G.1999. Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Fish, Food and Allied Workers (FFAW) 2004. Presentation to the Task Force on 
Seasonal Work. April 13. 
Frick, K. and Wren, J. 2000. Reviewing Occupational Health and Safety 
Management. In Systematic occupational health and safety management: 
Perspectives on an international development, ed. Frick, K., Jensen, P. L., 
Quinlan, M., and Wilthagen, T., 17-42. Amsterdam: Pergamon, Elsevier Science. 
Gough, J. and W.H. Lear. 1994. History and Management of the Fishery for Northern 
Cod in NAFO Divisions 2J, 3K and 3L. In Perspectives on Canadian Fisheries 
Management, ed. L.S. Parsons and W.H. Lear, Canadian Bulletin of Fisheries and 
Aquatic Sciences 226: 55-90. 
Grzetic, B. 2004. Women Fishes These Days. Halifax: Fernwood Publishing. 
Himmelweit, S. 2002. Making Visible the Hidden Economy: The Case for Gender-
Impact Analysis of Economic Policy. Feminist Economics 8(1): 49-70. 
Howse, D., Neis, B., Cartier, A., Gautrin, D., Horth-Susin, L., Jong, M., Swanson, M. 
2006. Gender and Snow Crab Occupational Asthma in Newfoundland and 
Labrador, Canada. Environmental Research. 101:163-174. 
HRDC 1996a. The Atlantic Groundfish Strategy: Background Paper, TAGS 
Household Study SP-AH007E-BP1-01-96, Ottawa: Human Resources 
Development Canada. 
1996b. Employment Insurance: Gender Impact Analysis. Ottawa. 
1994. Improving Social Security in Canada: A Discussion Paper. Ottawa: 
Minister of Supply and Services. 
HRSDC 2004. Employment Insurance Monitoring and Assessment Report. Ottawa. 
177 
International Journal of Canadian Studies 
Revue internationale d'études canadiennes 
— 2005. Digest of Benefit Entitlement Principles - Chapter 1. http;//www.hrsdc. 
gc.ca/en/ei/digest/1 _ 3 _ O.shtml Accessed November 16,2005. 
Larner, W. and Butler, M. 2005. Govemmentalities of Local Partnerships: The Rise of 
a 'Partnering State' in New Zealand. Studies in Political Economy 75: 79-102. 
Lewis, J. 1992. Gen.der and the Development of Welfare Regimes. Journal of 
European Social Policy 2(3): 159-73. 
MacDonald, M. 2005. The Crisis in Rural Labour Markets: Failures and Challenges 
for Regulation. In Challenging the Market: The Struggle to Regulate Work and 
Income, ed. Vosko, L. and Stanford J. (eds.) Montreal: McGill-Queens Press. 
1999. Restructuring, Gender and Social Security Reform in Canada. Journal 
of Canadian Studies 34(2): 57-88. 
1998. Gender and Social Security Reform: Pitfalls and Possibilities. Feminist 
Economics, 4(1): 1-27. 
Mansfield, B. 2004. Neoliberalism in the Oceans: 'Rationalization,' Property Rights, 
and the Commons Question. Geoforum 35:313-326. 
McCay, B.J. 2004. ITQs and Community: An Essay on Environmental Governance. 
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 33(2): 162-170. 
McKeen, W. and Porter, A. 2003. Politics and Transformation: Welfare State 
Restructuring in Canada. In Changing Canada: Political Economy as 
Transformation, ed. W. Clement and L. Vosko. Montreal and Kingston: McGill -
Queen's University Press. 
Murray, G.D., Neis, B. and Johnsen, J.P. 2006. Lessons Learned from Reconstructing 
Interactions between Local Ecological Knowledge, Fisheries Science and 
Fisheries Management in the Commercial Fisheries of Newfoundland and 
Labrador, Canada. Human Ecology 34(4): 549-572. 
Neis, B. and Grzetic, B. 2005. Environmental, Industrial, and Political Restructuring 
and the Health of Women Processing Workers in Newfoundland's Fishery 
Dependent Communities. In This Elusive Land: Women and the Canadian 
Environment, ed. M. Hessing, R. Raglon, C. and Sandilands, 82-101. Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press. 
Neis, B., Grzetic, B. and Pidgeon, M. 2001. From Fishplant to Nickel Smelter: Health 
Determinants and the Health of Newfoundland's Women's Fish and Shellfish 
Processors in an Environment of Restructuring. Research Report submitted to the 
National Network on Environments and Women's Health, York University. 
O'Connor, J., Orloff, A. S., and Shaver, S. 1999. States, Markets, Families. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
O'Rielly, A. 2004. A Framework for Fisheries, Rural Development and Fiscal 
Responsibility: Dealing with the Reality. A paper prepared for the Symposium on 
Growing the Economy of Newfoundland and Labrador October 4-5, 2004. 
http://www.mun.ca/harriscentre/Alastair_ORielly.pdfconsulted June 24,2005. 
Palmer, Ç.T. and Sinclair, P. 1997. When the Fish are Gone: Ecological Disaster and 
Fishers in Northwest Newfoundland. Halifax: Femwood Publishing. 
Pelot, R. 2000. Newfoundland Fishing Incidents: Perspectives and Analysis. Report 
submitted to Canadian Coast Guard (DFO). Department of Industrial 
Engineering, Daltech, Dalhousie University, Halifax, N.S. 
178 
State Policy, Livelihood Protection 
and Gender on Canada's East Coast 
Porter, A. 2003. Gendered States: Women, Unemployment Insurance and the Political 
Economy of the Welfare State in Canada, 1945-1997. Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press. 
Power, N. 2005. What do they call a Fisherman? Men, Gender and Restructuring in 
the Newfoundland Fishery. St. John's NL: ISER Books. 
and Harrison, D. 2005. The Power of Gender Ideology in the Face of 
Resource Decline in Newfoundland, Canada. In Changing Tides: Gender, 
Fisheries and Globalization, B. Neis, Binkley, M., Gerrard, S. and Maneschy, 
M.C., 229-42. Halifax: Fernwood Publishing. 
Power, N., Neis, B., Binkley, M. and Brennan, S. 2005. Newfoundland fishers' 
perceptions of risk. Presentation to the Canadian Association for Research on 
Work and Health Conference, Vancouver, May 15-17,2005. 
Praxis Research and Consulting. 2005. Setting a New Course: Phase 2 Human 
Resources Sector Study for the Fish Harvesting Industry in Canada. Report 
Prepared for the Canadian Council of Professional Fish Harvesters, Ottawa. 
Accessed at http://www.ccpfh-ccpp.org/cgi-bin%5Cfiles%5CSS-PhII-Final-RPT-
E.pdf. 
Professional Fish Harvesters Certification Board, Newfoundland and Labrador 
(PFHCB) 2005. Accessed at http://www.pfhcb.com/index.html. 
Pulkingham, J. .1998. Remaking the Social Divisions of Welfare: Gender, 
Dependency and UI Reform. Studies in Political Economy 56: 7-48. 
Rennie, R. 2005. The historical origins of an industrial disaster: occupational health 
and labour relations at the Fluorspar mines, St. Lawrence, Newfoundland, 1933-
1945. Labour/Le Travail 55:107-142. 
Schrank, W. 2005. The Newfoundland Fishery: Ten Years after the Moratorium. 
Marine Policy 29: 407-20. 
1998b. The Failure of Canadian Seasonal Fishermen's Unemployment 
Reform during the 1960s and 1970s. Marine Policy 22(1): 67-81. 
1995. Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction: Origins of the Current Crisis in 
Atlantic Canada's Fisheries. Marine Policy 19 (4): 285-299. 
Sinclair, P. 1987. From Traps to Draggers. St. John's Newfoundland: ISER Books. 
Task Force on the Workers Compensation Commission 2001. Changing the Mindset: 
Task Force Report on the Workers Compensation Commission. http://www.whscc. 
nf.ca/publications.htm checked June 14,2005. 
Tupper, A. 2001. The contested terrain of Canadian public administration in Canada's 
third century. Journal of Canadian Studies 35(4): 148. 
Vosko, L. and Stanford, J. (Eds.). 2005. Challenging the Market: The Struggle to 
Regulate Work and Income. Montreal: McGill-Queens Press. 
Whalen, J. 2005. Using Harvesters Knowledge to Develop an Individual based 
Computer Simulation Model of the St. John Bay, Newfoundland Lobster (Homarus 
americanusj Fishery. Unpublished Masters Dissertation, Dept. of Geography, 
Memorial University, St. John's. 
WHSCC 2005 Classification of Industries and Assessment Rates, http://www. 
whscc.nf.ca/pubs/industry.htm.consulted June 13th, 2005. 
179 
InternationalJournal of Canadian Studies 
Revue internationale d'études canadiennes 
Windle, M., Neis, B., Borastein, S., Binkley, M. and Navarrow, P. 2008. Fishing 
Occupational Health and Safety: A Comparison of Regulatory Regimes and Safety 
Outcomes in Six Countries. Marine Policy. 32: 701 -710. 
WHSCC Industry Fact Sheets http://www.whscc.nf.ca/pubs/industry.htm., consulted 
May 31st, 2005. 
180 
